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Sometimes history can be philosophically interesting. Barrett (2011) and colleagues (e.g., Barrett
et al., 2014, 2015) are to be congratulated on widening the scope of our understanding of animal
cognition to include its ecological elements. However, in their eagerness to overturn a narrow
model of computation, she and her colleagues have glossed over some rather interesting and salient
historical facts. This is poignant, as these facts strengthen their case, and sharpen the focus on the
more complete picture of ethologically valid cognition that they are drawing.
The key figure missing from the usual historical narrative is George Boole, whose bi-centenary
has just passed and (it just so happens) is the luminary whose soon-to-be-restored home is visible
from the office where I type this, in the University he led, and on the machine that his insights made
possible.
Barrett (2011) wants to draw a distinction between computation—in a narrow sense–abstracted
from any particular setting, and the highly embodied—especially ecologically rooted–cognition
that she sees in the animals she studies.
In support of this distinction, she cites Searle’s (1990) claim that, as a matter of history, humans
tend to use their most impressive piece of technology as a mental metaphor. As exemplars, the
ancient Greeks used models of torque-powered siege devices, de La Mettrie’s (1960) L’Homme
Machine used images of clockwork brains, Freud’s libidinous mind was powered by hydraulic
instincts, and so on (see Daugman, 2001 for a more extended discussion).
But, as an important historical fact the order of technology-then-metaphor is the other way
round in respect of the computational model. Thinking about thinking—specifically Boole’s
thinking about thinking–came long before the technology did. The technology grew out of it. Thus,
it’s less true to say that computers are a metaphor for thinking, than that thinking is a metaphor for
computation.
One important difference that modern computers have from the “technology as metaphor”
pattern is that in none of the other cases have advances been made in the technology as a result
of the comparison. Fountains, hydraulics, and clockwork did not become more sophisticated by
reflecting on their mind-like properties. On the other hand, artificial intelligence has advanced
considerably—to the point where it might be said, without hyperbole, that AI is in many cases the
proof that psychology as a science is advancing. When we can formalize an information processing
subsystem we can mechanize it. The fact is that we now live in a world where cars drive themselves,
airplanes land themselves, and face recognition software finally works.
Deep Mind is living (!) proof that that the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model of conditional
learning works and this is not a unique example (Van Hasselt et al., 2015). The human mind isn’t
a computer (Searle is right about this) but it does have thousands of computable functions and we
are making progress in understanding them. Will there be anything left over when we have solved
all these so-called easy problems of Chalmers (1996)? It is too early to say. However, one thing
that won’t be left over is the ecology. Barrett et al. (2015) have seen to that, by drawing attention
to the fact that said functions will be incomplete unless put in ecological (e.g., locally adaptive)
contexts. And that’s progress, but it is still functionalist progress. Indeed—it’s a justly celebrated
advance on the Gibsonian programme of embodied functional analysis of cognition. But—it is not
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less functionalist for all that. It turns out that the details of being
an adapted organism (functioning in its ecology) cannot be fully
abstracted into discrete disembodiedmodules fully specificable in
terms of brains alone. This might lead some to prematurely think
that functionalism has met its nadir, but this would be a mistake.
Before I get to why this is I need to say a few things about the
Boolean programme that underlies the functionalist revolution
in cognitive science.
For an exhaustive exegesis of Boole’s work here the authority
is (Corcoran, 2003), but the key ideas are quite accessible.
Boole’s basic insight receives its fullest expression in The Laws
of Thought (Boole, 1854) and this is an attempt to draw in
all human cognition (it was never about just mathematics)
together in terms of the deep underlying logical structure in
the most abstract form possible, while still being recognizable
at a syntactic level—this level being instantiated (in computers)
in terms of logic gates. Formalizing cognition was itself the
process which allowed physical computers to be eventually
possible.
The major later figures in this development are well known.
They include (but are not limited to) Claude Shannon, whose
1947 master’s thesis ushered in modern information theory,
through Alan Turing whose 1950 paper offered a principled way
to instantiate a machine that could compute any computable
function (Turing, 1950). John von Neumann’s complex proof of
how any machine is really a representation of a function (and
might thereby replicate itself) was also an important landmark,
in von Neumann and Burks (1966). Although all of these papers
had important practical outcomes and were (non-accidentally)
made by people with engineering connections, they were not
“how to build” papers. They were concerned with the formal
ways to represent cognition at the most basic level appreciable
by human beings. Note that this is not the same as saying that
this is the only level they exist at. Those formalizations resulted
in physical objects—such as the one I am typing this on—but the
causal arrow was not from object to concept. Computers (such as
the ones used to crack the Enigma codes) existed by the time of
Shannon, Turing, and others but the foundational functionalist
work had been done a century before by Boole. Thus, it is
strictly illegitimate to say that functionalism, as a strategy for
decomposing thought, relies on the computer metaphor. The
functionalism came first.
So much for history. Are there independent reasons for
thinking that the functionalist programme is not to be lightly
set aside? Indeed there are, but here I will only mention a few
relevant to Barrett et al. (2015) general programme, which I
should stress, are not things that they necessarily deny.
It’s commonly asserted that the computational metaphor is
about the formal manipulation of symbols (Searle, 1990). But
this is a half-truth. At one level, a level that makes semantic
sense to a human observer, computers manipulate symbols. But
mainly what they do is turn logic gates on and off really fast.
And no human observer would be able to make any sense of that
at the speeds that it occurs in a modern computer. Of course,
if you delve deeper still what we have in the computer is bits
of information, and witnessing that wouldn’t convey anything
much that an unaided human observer could make meaningful.
Indeed, the (physical) computer is itself the aid. Boole’s key
insight was to analyse the logic of human cognition at the mid-
level and realize that this level could be formalized. And once
something can be formalized it can bemechanized. And the proof
that he was right is the tasty pudding of modern computing—
which undeniably works, or you would not be reading this.
Does a modern desktop computer (or any computer for that
matter) replicate human consciousness? Of course it doesn’t. But
the formalization of human cognition is a different matter—the
computer comes along almost as a by-product of the attempt to
do that (albeit a by-product that demonstrates that wemust be on
to something).
It might be objected that humans do not naturally think in
terms of logic gates. And this is true, but hardly to the point.
We are typically unconscious of the underlying computational
structure of things that come naturally to us. Most of us are
unconscious of the grammar of our native tongues unless it is
formally taught to us, and it is entirely unnecessary to learn
the formal grammar of a language to be able to converse in it.
Nevertheless, the formal grammar lays bare the structure of that
language.
A follow-up objection might be that, while it is admitted that
Boole laid bare the formal elements of some aspects of human
thought, there are others left untouched. This may well be true
and if it is true then the attempt to build upon his insights with
formal instantiations of computation into physical systems that
replicate human thought will be forever doomed. Once again—it
is too early to tell.
One further common mistake is to note that humans
aren’t conscious of these sorts of processes. Cognition is not
consciousness. Moravec (2000) drew insightful attention to
precisely this fact. He noted that the tasks that required very
smart humans to perform (e.g., diagnose disease, fly airplanes,
play chess) were comparatively trivial to automate (incidentally—
this doesn’t imply that the automated version completely
captures the path of human cognition to achieving them). At the
same time, it proved very hard to automate things that to humans
were trivial, such as climbing stairs and recognizing faces. The
solution to this paradox is that evolutionarily ancient processes
do not need to draw on novel conscious elements. But—and this
is the crucial point—they are nonetheless cognitive functions for
all that.
Computational modeling is rooted in the realization that all
observations reveal detectable differences. These are information.
If a set of these can be meaningfully grouped into a system
then a change is a state change, and any regularities in such
changes describe a computational—that is a functional-system.
Thus, computation would exist even if computers didn’t—this is
where critiques like those of Searle’s (1990) miss the point. The
fact that an existing physical computer is, as he puts it, “just a
hunk of junk” is neither here nor there. Once the system can
move between states and store them it’s a Turing machine, Post
machine, or Lambda calculus (Church, 1936)—which for these
purposes don’t have any significant differences between them. All
such functional states are computational states—defined by the
moving from one state to another. Knowledge—and it doesn’t
matter here if we are talking about humans, other animals, or
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even plants, is therefore the acquiring of usable local regularities.
An ecology, in other words. Evolution has produced systems that
predict things about their environments (brains) that sometime
hang out together in social groups. But all of these things
are computational states—and adding ecology to the complete
picture does not change this fact. Indeed, it deepens it by
showing how affordances must be part of the complete functional
picture. Indeed, as Barrett et al. (2014, 2015) are showing, the
minimalist bet of some branches of cognitive science—e.g., that
we could completely capture the functionalist understanding of
the organism without seeing the details of the system it lives
in, may well turn out to be false. It turns out that we do need
to understand how an organism responds to affordances, that
the functional details of perceptual organization matter, and so
forth.
But, since we are all functionalists, we really have very good
reason to all get along. If it really is functionalism all the way
down—then there is no radical split to be had between functional
models and the ones Barrett et al. (2015) espouse. What she
and her colleagues have done is draw attention to the need
for (computational) systems to be closely connected to their
ecologies. Specifically, that perception and cognition indeed need
to be closely related (Barrett, 2011, p.22). It might be noted
that, in this, she echoes the call of Brooks (1990) whose use of
the concept of subsumption layers reminds us that one way to
escape the representational issue in artificial systems is to make
the system use the real world as its model and in this they
offer a much needed route to allow affordances to enter into the
modeling. Functionalism isn’t just the only game in town. It’s the
only game in any ecology.
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